

Challenges for modelling interventions for future pandemics

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52 **Abstract**

53 Mathematical modelling and statistical inference provide a framework to evaluate different non-
54 pharmaceutical and pharmaceutical interventions for the control of epidemics that has been
55 widely used during the COVID-19 pandemic. In this paper, lessons learned from this and previous
56 epidemics are used to highlight the challenges for future pandemic control. We consider the
57 availability and use of data, as well as the need for correct parameterisation and calibration for
58 different model frameworks. We discuss challenges that arise in describing and distinguishing
59 between different interventions, within different modelling structures, and allowing both within
60 and between host dynamics. We also highlight challenges in modelling the health economic and
61 political aspects of interventions. Given the diversity of these challenges, a broad variety of
62 interdisciplinary expertise is needed to address them, combining mathematical knowledge with
63 biological and social insights, and including health economics and communication skills.
64 Addressing these challenges for the future requires strong cross-disciplinary collaborations
65 together with close communication between scientists and policy makers.

66

67

68 **1 Introduction**

69 In the first two decades of the 21st century, we have witnessed several outbreaks of infectious diseases
70 that expanded across several continents (SARS, Zika, MERS), caused a large number of deaths (Ebola), or
71 grew out to a pandemic (influenza 2009, SARS-CoV-2). By far the largest impact on humanity can be
72 attributed to the ongoing SARS-CoV-2 pandemic, that has affected almost all countries in the world in
73 ways unimaginable before the year 2020. All these outbreaks required significant efforts in mitigation
74 and control measures, since they caused millions of deaths worldwide and had enormous economic and
75 social impacts.

76
77 From the start of the SARS-CoV-2 pandemic, mathematical modelling has played a key role in supporting
78 policy makers in their decisions about control measures. Politicians and society alike have looked to
79 modellers to provide them with predictions about the future course of the pandemic, with assessments
80 of which interventions should work and with guidance for how to interpret the developing numbers of
81 cases, hospitalizations, and deaths [McBryde et al 2020]. This puts a large responsibility to those who
82 develop mathematical models and analyse intervention strategies. Fortunately, there is a well-
83 established toolbox for infectious disease modelling, based on the pioneering work of Kermack and
84 McKendrick and many following generations of mathematical modellers [Diekmann et al 2012]. The
85 theory of infectious disease dynamics described in terms of differential equations is grounded in
86 dynamical systems theory, and has led to the development of key concepts such as the basic
87 reproduction number. Nevertheless, there remain challenges for modelling of infectious diseases and
88 interventions, many of which became clearly visible during the unfolding pandemic of SARS-CoV-2
89 [Thompson et al 2020] and are discussed in detail in [Marion et al \(Ch 06\)](#).

90
91 Modelling can be useful in assessing impact of interventions, with three modelling approaches widely
92 used: compartmental models (deterministic or stochastic), network models (either static or dynamic),
93 and individual (or agent) based micro-simulation models, in which individual agents and their
94 interactions are simulated as a stochastic process. These approaches differ in the amount of information
95 about individuals and their contacts that is included ranging from very explicit in individual based
96 models to aggregated in compartmental models. In network models details of the contact structure is
97 taken into account, while individuals still may be alike with respect to other features. While individual
98 based models seem to be most realistic, they require information on many more parameters and are
99 mostly not amenable to mathematical analysis. Compartmental models on the other hand are more
100 readily parameterized, but may lack the level of detail needed to answer policy related questions.
101 Another important issue, that is especially relevant for assessing non-pharmaceutical interventions (NPI)


102 relying on changes of contact networks and their transmissibility, is that all approaches have major
103 drawbacks in addressing structural aspects on a level between the individual and population levels. We
104 need to understand better the mesoscopic level, if we really want to assess the impact of interventions
105 such as social distancing, closing of schools and workplaces, contact tracing, and travel restrictions on
106 epidemic spread. While it is possible to describe the contact network in all details in an individual based
107 model, it is time consuming to perform extensive model analysis including sensitivity analyses. For
108 network models, some theoretical results are available, but mostly for networks with structure that
109 does not properly reflect real contact patterns. Finally, with compartmental models it is hard to take
110 correlations between connected individuals into account without generating an exploding number of
111 equations.

112
113 Thus, the overriding challenge as with all modelling is **to find models that are complex enough to**
114 **reflect sufficient details of the system, but simple enough not to get lost in the jungle of details.**
115 Ideally, we need tools to describe exactly the structures of interest in a generic way, i.e., such that one
116 can draw conclusions that are valid for a large range of parameter values and situations.

117
118 In application of modelling interventions for policy support, the main challenge is the **need to clearly**
119 **define objectives and aims of modelling in interaction with policy makers**, who typically consult
120 mathematical modellers to determine any intervention strategies that may need to be introduced in
121 order to minimise the impact of an ongoing epidemic [Grimm et al 2020]. In such circumstances, it is
122 vital that policy makers define what they consider the main aims of interventions, or more technically,
123 the **objective function** that they are looking to minimise [e.g. Gösgens et al 2021]. For human
124 pathogens, the objective may be simply to minimise the number of individuals getting sick or dying from
125 infection, whilst for livestock or plant crop diseases, it may be important to minimise the direct cost of
126 an outbreak to the agricultural industry. The aim of an intervention, which may also change over time,
127 can often critically affect which control policy is deemed optimal.

128
129 In this paper, we reflect on what the above challenges mean for various aspects of mathematical
130 modelling of interventions, e.g., for data collection and availability, for biological parameters that affect
131 intervention effectiveness, for the social structure leading that may be targeted by interventions, and
132 for the economic impact of intervention measures (Figure 1). We build on progress since publication of
133 an earlier series of challenges paper [Lloyd-Smith et al 2015], and delineate challenges that remain or
134 have emerged since. One of the main challenges that was addressed by Funk et al [2015], namely
135 incorporating behaviour into mathematical models, had proven to be crucial during the SARS-CoV2

136 pandemic, but also challenges around vaccination [Metcalf et al 2015] and around emergence of
 137 pathogens [Gog et al 2015] are highly relevant. We hope to give inspiration to future generations of
 138 mathematical modellers who might be faced with dealing with a future pandemic and are struggling to
 139 give good advice to policy makers on which interventions may be effective in a given situation.
 140
 141



142
 143 **Figure 1:** Relationships between interventions and methodological aspects.
 144

145
 146 **2 Data challenges relating to interventions in a future epidemic**

147 Biological characteristics and transmission routes strongly determine which interventions could be
 148 effective, and on which time scale interventions should be rolled out. Usually, data are scarce at the
 149 onset of the epidemic, but for various types of data the challenges remain in the later stages. Here we
 150 focus on data challenges related to modelling interventions, though other data challenges can emerge
 151 during an epidemic [cf Ch 06 and Ch 08].
 152

153 **2.1 Biological data**

154 Transmission models require key biological parameters, such as the duration of infectious period,
155 infectivity of symptomatic and asymptomatic cases, and case fatality ratios. Intervention planning can
156 then explore how changes to these model parameters influence future epidemic trajectories. However,
157 not only are fundamental biological data scarce during the initial phase of an epidemic, but they are also
158 affected by biases because of their dependence on uncertain information obtained from reported cases
159 and surveillance data. Moreover, time interval distributions are sensitive to truncation and censoring
160 biases, since data are collected while the epidemic is expanding [Scalia Tomba 2010, Park et al. 2020]. In
161 later phases, identified cases still depend heavily on the adopted surveillance strategy, and parameters
162 like time interval distributions are potentially affected by the intervention measures. **Designing data**
163 **collection studies that overcome these biases, or statistical methods that account for them, remain**
164 **fundamental issues for obtaining reliable parameter estimates.**

165
166 **2.2 Surveillance data**

167 Surveillance data (e.g., case notifications, hospitalisations, and mortality) represent the most direct
168 monitoring tools of an ongoing epidemic. These data are used to estimate biological parameters,
169 monitor the prevalence and severity of the disease, and calibrate transmission models that evaluate the
170 impact of interventions. Regarding model calibration, special consideration should be given as to
171 whether to use case notification, hospitalisation, or mortality data, or some combination of these. All
172 empirical datasets may contain potential biases, depending on how they are assembled. Whilst case
173 notification data may be sufficiently informative for pathogens with a low proportion of asymptomatic
174 cases, such as the severe acute respiratory syndrome (SARS), they pose challenges for pathogens like
175 SARS-CoV-2, characterised by a high proportion of unreported asymptomatic or mildly symptomatic
176 cases. Testing protocols may change significantly during the epidemic, which can further disrupt fitting
177 transmission models to cases data.

178
179 Hospital data tend to be more reliable because hospital-seeking behaviour is less likely to change over
180 time, and are therefore used ubiquitously in modelling studies [Di Domenico et al 2020, Rozhnova et al
181 2021, Viana et al 2021, Funk et al 2021]. However, the potential overwhelming of the healthcare system
182 and an evolving understanding of when to seek medical attention might shift during a pandemic.
183 Moreover, despite being routinely collected by hospitals, hospital data are rarely publicly available and,
184 especially at the beginning of the epidemic, they are often not aggregated at a national scale. **Designing**
185 **protocols of data collection and aggregation into publicly available datasets, together with strategic**
186 **margins of flexibility so that the protocols could be promptly adapted to the ongoing outbreak, could**

187 partially mitigate these biases. This would provide a framework that ensures consistency in data
188 collection from the beginning of the outbreak [cf Ch 08]

189
190 **A further challenge when using surveillance data is that they are inevitably lagged relative to**
191 **infections, upon which interventions aim to act**, due to the concatenation of incubation period and
192 test- or care-seeking behaviour. Understanding these lags is vital when designing intervention timelines
193 for two main reasons: first, to avoid severe consequences when the effect of an intervention manifests
194 itself in the surveillance data only after a consistent delay [Pellis et al 2020]; second, to facilitate their
195 later assessment. Gradual changes in policies can ensure windows of opportunity for disentangling the
196 effect of different interventions and evaluating their effectiveness.

197
198 For pathogens with high proportions of unascertained infections, models fitted only to surveillance data
199 may not be sufficient to estimate the true incidence or prevalence. Here, seroprevalence data become
200 fundamental to calibrate the models [Rozhnova et al 2021, Viana et al 2021] or, where available,
201 community infection surveys. Moreover, longitudinal seroprevalence data, and individual data on the
202 duration and extent to which prior infection confers protection against future infections, are required to
203 investigate the impact of interventions on longer timescales. However, during initial stages of an
204 epidemic **these data are usually available for either relatively short observation periods, small sample**
205 **sizes, or selected populations**. A further challenge in using seroprevalence data can be due to the
206 sensitivity of serology to identify individuals with prior infection. For example, there is growing evidence
207 that SARS-CoV-2 antibodies may be below the level of detection for persons who experienced
208 asymptomatic or mild infections [Burgess et al 2020], and that antibody levels decline over time.
209 Additionally, it is not clear to what extent a negative serological result denotes lack of immunity.
210 Tackling these challenges is vital for modelling interventions in the long term.

211
212 When designing interventions, it is important to understand transmission within different settings.
213 Genetic sequencing data can facilitate investigation of outbreaks by reconstructing potential
214 transmission trees, e.g., to discriminate within-household transmission from between-household
215 transmission [cf Ch 06 and Ch 07], or identify nosocomial transmission. Genetic sequencing is also
216 important for monitoring the emergence of novel variants, which may adversely affect intervention
217 policies, through, for example, increased transmission or vaccine escape mutations. **Genetic sequencing**
218 **capacity is and will likely remain in the future highly heterogeneous across countries, as manifested**
219 **during the COVID-19 pandemic. This can skew the observation of any new variants of concern, leading**
220 **to delays in identifying and adapting to novel variants.**

221

222 **2.3 Behavioural and adherence data**

223 Scenario simulations exploring the impact of interventions require data on people's behaviour and
224 changes thereof as a response to interventions. For sexually transmitted pathogens, the relevant
225 measure is the number of sexual partners per unit of time, but also partnership duration, concurrent
226 partnerships [Morris 1997] and mixing between population subgroups with different sexual risk
227 behaviour can be important quantities [Rozhnova et al 2016, Erens et al]. For airborne diseases, an
228 individual's behaviour is measured by the number of transmission-relevant contacts a person has per
229 day in a specific setting. The baseline age-dependent mixing patterns of contacts relevant for airborne
230 transmission are available for a few countries [Mossong et al 2008] and have been projected for other
231 countries for which social contact data are not available [Prem et al 2017, Mistry et al 2021]. There are
232 fewer contact data sources when it comes to the impacts that different interventions might have on
233 mixing. As part of the response to COVID-19, several countries have conducted contact surveys during
234 different stages of the pandemic [Backer et al 2020, Jarvis et al 2020, Zhang et al 2020], which have
235 been used successfully in modelling studies [Rozhnova et al 2021, Kucharski et al 2020]. However, in the
236 absence of setting-specific contact matrices assessed at different time points during an ongoing
237 epidemic, model simulations must involve assumptions that may influence model predictions.

238

239 Understanding adherence to regulations is vital in evaluating past and designing future interventions.
240 However, adherence data may be challenging to obtain. Partially to address this issue, the SARS-CoV-2
241 pandemic has showcased the importance of digital resources (such as contact tracing or health
242 reporting apps). These tools allow the collection of large amounts of data while minimising delays in
243 collection, and are widely accessible by many portions of society [Colizza et al 2020]. However, they
244 have also revealed a strong hesitancy by many users mainly due to data privacy concerns [Blasimme et
245 al 2020]. Where government apps may struggle with public confidence, private health apps could help
246 to fill the void. Throughout the COVID-19 pandemic, various health apps have attempted to collect data,
247 such as symptom profiles, adherence data, and public insights [Chidanbaram et al 2020].

248

249 Another challenge with adherence data is that high adherence might not correlate with contact
250 reduction for some portions of society: for instance, essential workers might report high adherence to
251 social distancing measures, while still performing most of their usual activities. Hence, surveys may be
252 better focused on quantifying behaviour rather than adherence. Data collection apps and surveys
253 strategically designed in collaboration between modellers, behavioural scientists, and statisticians may
254 assume a fundamental role in planning behavioural data collection before, during, and after an

255 epidemic, to optimise the available data both for prospective planning and retrospective assessment of
256 the effect of interventions [Salathe et al 2012]. Mobile telephone data [Grantz et al 2020; Oliver et al
257 2020, Chang et al 2021] and mobility data [Google 2021] can also be leveraged to measure behavioural
258 changes and adherence, and can be incorporated into transmission models. However, while the latter
259 remain public, mobile telephone or airline data might not be accessible to all researchers. **Wider
260 accessibility to local and global mobility data might become a fundamental support to models for
261 future pandemics. Even with wider accessibility, a challenge still remains here pertaining to finding
262 the acceptable level of aggregation that balances out privacy issues whilst accurately informing
263 models of mobility patterns.** This is also discussed in Ch 07.

264

265 **2.4 Vaccination data**

266 Vaccinations and treatments are key interventions for managing disease outbreaks. However, these are
267 often not available at the start of a pandemic and need to be developed throughout its course (for
268 example Ebola and COVID-19). When modelling the rollout of such interventions, their effectiveness has
269 to be estimated as quickly as possible. In addition to the challenges involved in designing studies to
270 estimate vaccine efficacy in the context of an evolving pandemic [cf Ch 04a], the way the data are
271 collected and recorded also present challenges [Lipsitch 2020]. For example, vaccination data linked
272 with other health care data or age-stratified vaccination data may not be readily available, thus limiting
273 the opportunity to estimate the impact of the vaccine deployment on symptoms, transmission, risk of
274 hospitalisation and death across different age groups. Finally, the uptake of vaccination is of utmost
275 importance when assessing the impact of vaccination as increasing vaccine hesitancy has been shown to
276 hamper the success of vaccination programmes in the past. Data quantifying vaccine hesitancy would
277 be vital for modelling vaccine impact (Ch 08). Modelling the spread of vaccine hesitancy, such as
278 through social media networks, may inform what type of data needs to be collected to account for
279 vaccine hesitancy in models.

280

281 **3 Challenges in developing a theoretical framework for understanding** 282 **intervention impact**

283 **3.1 Epidemiological distributions and within-host dynamics**

284 One of the most common theoretical frameworks for understanding transmission is compartmental
285 modelling, in which individuals are grouped according to their infection and/or symptom status [Keeling
286 and Rohani 2011]. Deterministic or stochastic compartmental models can be used to represent
287 epidemic dynamics, and the impacts of interventions can be assessed by making relevant adjustments
288 to the model (e.g., altering the values of model parameters or including new compartments). Standard

289 compartmental models are based on the assumption that individuals remain in compartments for
290 exponentially distributed periods, while Gamma or Lognormal distributions often provide more
291 accurate fits to data. Similarly, infectivity may be variable during the infectious period, which can be
292 accounted for using age of infection models that assume continuous “infectivity curves” [Handel et al
293 2013, Diekmann et al 2021], sometimes approximated using multiple compartments of infectious
294 individuals [Cunniffe et al 2012, Hart et al 2020]. Although these elements of a framework for describing
295 epidemics based on realistic biological distributions exist, and relationships between distributions of
296 epidemiological time periods and key epidemiological parameters (e.g., reproduction numbers and
297 epidemic growth rates) are well known, the challenge remains to integrate these components into
298 **flexible and readily available epidemiological modelling tools that can be adapted for specific**
299 **epidemics.**

300
301 Similar arguments hold for the task of incorporating waning immunity or partial immunity in
302 compartmental models [Heffernan and Keeling 2009]. Boosting and waning of immunity is often
303 included by distinguishing various levels of immunity and transitions between these levels. An
304 alternative approach is to model waning immunity as an exponential decay process with boosting
305 events as jumps in the immunity level [Diekmann et al 2018]. Combining within-host modelling of the
306 immune system with between-host modelling of transmission dynamics to assess impact of
307 interventions is an area for further research. A related challenge is to **develop a framework to allow**
308 **interpretation of serological data collected in populations to assess the impacts of interventions**
309 [Teunis et al 2012, Hens et al 2012].

310 311 **3.2 Time scales and geographical scales**

312 Another challenge is to **design interventions in which the scale of interventions is matched with the**
313 **scale of transmission**, both geographically and temporally. Assessments of interventions sometimes rely
314 on simple models that do not account explicitly for the geographical or spatial scale of transmission. For
315 example, the level of vaccination required to achieve herd immunity is often stated, but standard
316 approximations assume that the population is well-mixed. The time-dependent reproduction numbers
317 can be tracked to assess the effectiveness of interventions and the level of interventions required to
318 bring an epidemic under control [Wallinga and Teunis 2004, Cori et al 2013, Thompson et al 2019], but
319 are delayed by generation time intervals.

320
321 While the effects of some interventions may not depend on the spatial scale of transmission - for
322 example, population-wide strategies such as nationwide social distancing measures - the effectiveness

323 of many localised measures that seek to bring a newly invading pathogen under control depends
324 critically on the relationship between the geographical and temporal scale of transmission and the
325 equivalent geographical and temporal scale of the interventions. The importance of matching the
326 spatial scale of interventions to the spatial scale of transmission has been demonstrated clearly using
327 epidemiological models of foot and mouth disease epidemics, for which the scales over which to
328 implement culling [Keeling et al 2001, Ferguson et al 2001, Tildesley et al 2010] and reactive vaccination
329 strategies [Tildesley et al 2006] have been considered.

330

331 For epidemics in human populations, the choice of interventions to introduce involves balancing the
332 benefits in terms of disease reduction against the costs (see Introduction), including economic costs and
333 health harms due to intense measures [Xue et al 2012, Sandmann et al 2021]. As a result, localised
334 interventions such as the introduction of tiers [Davies et al 2021; Viana 2021] have the potential to lead
335 to successful disease control without entire populations being placed under severe restrictions. When
336 considering the optimal spatial extent of tiers, the spatial scale of transmission of the pathogen should
337 be considered, accounting for the movement of individuals between tiers. Of particular importance is
338 the insight that introducing restrictions along local authority borders may not provide the optimal
339 balance between benefits and costs [Thompson et al 2016].

340

341 Similarly, the introduction of interventions, as well as the duration over which interventions must be
342 maintained, depends on the timescale of transmission. This in turn depends on the duration of
343 epidemiological periods (see above), and human behaviour plays a key role. When a pathogen first
344 invades a new location, a timely response is critical to reduce the risk that initial cases of disease spark a
345 large epidemic [Thompson et al 2020b]. If interventions are instead introduced after several generations
346 of infection have occurred, then containment may be impossible. At the opposite end of an epidemic, it
347 is only possible to declare an epidemic over with confidence once a sufficient interval has passed since
348 the “final case” [Nishiura et al 2016]. As an example, Ebola epidemics are declared over by the World
349 Health Organization and interventions are relaxed once a period of 42 days has passed without any new
350 probable or confirmed case, which is twice the length of an approximate maximal incubation period
351 [World Health Organization, 2020] and should ensure a low probability that active cases are still
352 present. As a result, matching both the spatial and temporal scales of interventions to the analogous
353 epidemiological scales is a critical aspect of many disease control strategies [Gilligan et al 2007, Filipe et
354 al 2012, Cunniffe et al 2015].

355

356 **3.3 Multiple strains and evolution**

357 Interventions affect pathogen evolution in two key ways: by changing (typically increasing) the selection
358 pressure on the pathogen, and by altering (typically decreasing) mutation supply. When there is a
359 plentiful supply of susceptible hosts, the selection pressure is relatively weak, and when there is a
360 limited supply the selection pressure is relatively strong. Mutation supply is generally proportional to
361 the number of infections. Interventions such as social distancing and vaccination can therefore increase
362 the selection pressure for new variants, while simultaneously reducing mutation supply. Since the rate
363 of pathogen adaptation depends on the balance between mutation supply and selection pressure,
364 interventions may decrease cases in the short-term while increasing the likelihood that new variants will
365 emerge. An important challenge involves analysing evidence for evolutionary changes during epidemics
366 [Day et al 2020] and **quantifying the net risk of emergence of novel pathogen variants under**
367 **interventions given these trade-offs** [Cobey et al 2021].

368
369 Modelling of interventions typically focuses on epidemiological impacts on infections and mortality,
370 without considering potential evolutionary consequences. This may lead to strategies, where short-term
371 reductions in infections or mortality may come at the cost of higher infections or mortality over the
372 longer-term due to pathogen evolution. For example, from a short-term perspective it may be desirable
373 to prioritise vaccinations for those who are most vulnerable to disease, but this may increase the
374 likelihood of a vaccine-escape variant significantly [Saad-Roy 2021]. This may be the case if vaccines do
375 not block transmission entirely and if vulnerable hosts are not the individuals who contribute most to
376 transmission [Gog et al 2021].

377
378 Some patterns are intuitive. For example, introducing a vaccine when prevalence (and hence mutation
379 supply) is high is more likely to lead to a vaccine-escape variant emerging than when prevalence is low.
380 However, the extent to which one must use NPIs to reduce cases while rolling out vaccinations to
381 achieve substantial reductions in the risk of vaccine escape, or the order in which to vaccinate groups,
382 requires more detailed modelling. Over the longer-term, if a pandemic pathogen transitions to an
383 endemic state, then immune pressure from the host population may lead to diversification into a
384 number of coexisting variants [Buckee et al 2011], or successive variants emerging over time [Gupta et
385 al 1998]. Modelling the transition to endemicity may therefore require a multi-strain framework.

386
387 Multi-strain frameworks can help to quantify both the likelihood and timescales over which new
388 variants may emerge, and hence how interventions should be designed to limit opportunities for
389 pathogen adaptation. Given that newly emergent strains are by definition rare, stochasticity is likely to
390 play an important role in the probability that a new variant will go extinct even if it has above average

391 fitness. While general theory exists to understand the effects of stochasticity on rates of adaptation, a
392 key challenge is to **translate modelling theories about pathogen evolution under interventions to**
393 **policies for specific epidemics.**

394

395 **3.4 Interventions in different epidemic phases**

396 Interventions have the potential for significant impact early in an outbreak and decision-makers may
397 not be able to wait for uncertainties to be resolved before introducing control measures. A challenge is
398 **to make models that are simple and robust, so that quick decisions can be supported even if precise**
399 **predictions are not possible.** Deciding between two candidate interventions may be possible without
400 being able to assess their exact impacts in terms of precise numbers of future cases. Of course, a policy
401 that is introduced at an early stage may not be truly optimal, so it is important to adopt adaptive
402 approaches to decision-making and fine tune any response as more information becomes available
403 [Shea et al 2014, Atkins et al 2020]. Also, characteristics of people most affected by an epidemic may
404 change as the epidemic takes its course and reaches different strata of a population.

405

406 As an epidemic progresses, and more data become available, interventions may have a more limited
407 effect since containment is then impossible. Additionally, a policy that may have seemed optimal when
408 data were scarce may no longer prove to be most effective. The ability to resolve uncertainty itself may
409 also depend upon the initial interventions that are chosen. An intense policy of suppression in the early
410 stages may appear optimal to minimise the short-term impact of an outbreak, but this may also lead to
411 a protracted period in which model parameters cannot be resolved, given the resultant small number of
412 initial cases. Meanwhile a less intense initial policy, whilst not optimal in the short term, may lead to
413 faster parameter resolution and the ability to switch to a preferred policy sooner, once uncertainty is
414 resolved. While ethical considerations such as an individual's right to treatment must be prioritised over
415 allowing a pathogen to spread without interventions, there is a need to develop approaches for
416 **estimating impacts of interventions that are in place and resolving uncertainty to establish the**
417 **optimal long-term control policy.** As described in the Introduction, identifying the optimal policy
418 requires the objective function for the ongoing epidemic to be defined clearly.

419

420 **4 Challenges in modelling pharmaceutical interventions and prevention**

421 **4.1 Vaccination**

422 Vaccination [see also Ch 4a] is a pharmaceutical intervention of primary importance, as it allows
423 conferring protection against infection and/or disease to individuals in a safe and controlled way.

424 Mathematical models can be used to evaluate the effectiveness of vaccination and inform the design of

425 optimal vaccination strategies in terms of feasibility, costs, and disease burden [Matrajt et al 2020,
426 Bubar et al 2021]. Questions that have been particularly acute during the SARS-CoV-2 pandemic include
427 how to inform optimal vaccination policies under a dynamic and quickly evolving vaccine landscape,
428 involving: (i) uncertain or unknown efficacy of vaccine against infection and disease (e.g. reduction in
429 risk of infection, hospitalisation or death, as well as in the chance of onward transmission); (ii) delivery
430 of multiple recommended doses, raising questions on whether a broader distribution of less-protective
431 single-dose vaccination is better than delivery of multiple doses to fewer individuals and, if so, how far
432 apart from each other [Hill and Keeling 2021, Saad-Roy et al 2021]; (iii) simultaneous use of multiple
433 vaccines with different properties, which, on the one hand, might shape the evolutionary landscape,
434 and, on the other hand, opens up questions about the consequences of mixing and matching doses
435 from different vaccines; (iv) possible evolution of vaccine escapes that become dominant and
436 potentially shape other simultaneous interventions [Saad-Roy et al 2021, and Section 3.4].

437 **A fundamental modelling challenge is informing vaccine prioritisation and allocation when vaccine**
438 **effectiveness and contact structure are highly heterogeneous.** Possible allocation strategies may differ
439 substantially in their target such as prioritisation by age or risk group [Wallinga et al 2010, Viana et al
440 2021, Bubar et al 2021], and specific strategies like ring immunisation may be considered for specific
441 diseases [Kucharski et al 2016, Kretzschmar et al 2004]. Mathematical models should ideally be able to
442 compare different allocation strategies based on the different stratification of the population. However,
443 models encapsulating all the required complexities are often too detailed to parameterise robustly, and
444 rather multiple simpler models are used that capture only a part of the desired heterogeneities.

445
446 If a certain amount of vaccine is available before the outbreak starts, the following spread can still be
447 described by an epidemic model with constant parameters, more amenable to mathematical
448 tractability. However, with new emerging pathogens, vaccines are typically developed and distributed
449 while the outbreak is ongoing, raising further challenges during the transient vaccination phase. Indeed,
450 mathematical models should capture the dynamic vaccine deployment and distribution, which is often
451 spread over a long time period, and untangle the effect stemming from vaccination compared to the
452 effect from NPIs or lockdowns [Moore et al 2021, Jentsch et al 2021, Viana et al 2021]. These challenges
453 come on top of the inevitable aforementioned uncertainty in vaccine efficacy, which might improve
454 over time, as well as the specific distribution policy and the uncertainty in underlying changes in contact
455 patterns and transmission. The issues related to vaccination are not confined to the mass-vaccination
456 campaign during the outbreak itself, but extend also in the later phase, when long-term vaccination
457 strategies must be investigated in order to face a potential endemic phase of the disease. Booster

458 vaccination sometime after the second dose, or indeed the need for a yearly vaccination analogous to
459 the seasonal vaccination are possible options for the future.

460

461 **4.2 Treatment as prevention**

462 Treatment of an infectious disease firstly benefits the patient, who gets the treatment, but often also
463 impacts transmission by reducing the duration of an infection, infectiousness [Cohen et al 2011] or
464 both. Therefore, in modelling interventions, we are interested in how application of a treatment in a
465 large part of the infected population influences the epidemic dynamics. An example of major public
466 health relevance is HIV, where the strategy of “treatment as prevention” has been declared the major
467 strategy that may lead to elimination of HIV in the long run. Strategic goals like the 90-90-90 goal
468 formulated by WHO [UNAIDS 2017], which aims at 90 percent of infected persons knowing their HIV
469 status, 90 percent of those starting antiretroviral treatment, and 90 percent of those being virally
470 suppressed, is viewed as a step towards eradicating HIV globally. More recently, the WHO strategy has
471 been updated to the 95-95-95 goal, with HIV elimination as a target on the horizon. The rationale is that
472 treatment reduces the viral load to undetectable levels and with that stops further transmission.
473 Mathematical modelling has been used to assess whether this strategy is sufficient to achieve
474 elimination of HIV in the foreseeable future [Granich et al 2009; Eaton et al 2012]. Apart from treatment
475 of infected persons, also pre-exposure prophylaxis (PrEP) is used to prevent transmission to susceptible
476 persons and influences the epidemic dynamics of HIV.

477

478 For other infectious diseases for which no vaccine is available, mass treatment is sometimes an
479 intervention option. Mass drug administration has been tested as an intervention for vector-borne
480 diseases [Mutapi et al 2017], sexually transmitted diseases like gonorrhoea and chlamydia [Korenromp
481 et al 2000], and hepatitis C infection [Hill et al 2017]. However, these intervention programmes have not
482 always been very successful, some of them because of development of resistance to antibiotics and
483 antivirals, some of them because of lack of adherence to treatment regimens and difficulties in rolling
484 out treatment in large parts of a population, or because of reinfection after treatment, as in the case for
485 instance of hepatitis C infection [Lambers et al 2011].

486

487 **A challenge for mathematical modelling of treatment impact is to incorporate the mechanism with**
488 **which treatment affects epidemic dynamics** in an appropriate way into the model. How do treated
489 people differ from untreated infected persons? What is the effect of treatment in different phases of
490 the infectious period, and by how much is infectiousness lowered? Do treated persons have different
491 contact patterns than untreated persons? Furthermore, if elimination is the goal, we are confronted

492 with **the challenges of defining what we mean by elimination and how to model an infection at the**
493 **point or elimination**. It is clear that stochastic models are required, that can describe extinction
494 properly, but which stochastic processes will govern the dynamics near extinction? When do we know
495 that extinction has actually taken place? This question has been addressed in the context of polio
496 [Eichner & Dietz 1996].

497
498 An emerging challenge is **how mathematical models can inform the design of pharmaceutical products**
499 **in view of potential health crises**. Mathematical models could explore the effect of pharmaceutical
500 products on the disease dynamics at the population level, and help investigate to what extent sub-
501 optimal but generic drugs could contribute to the response to pandemics, or to virus elimination [Slater
502 et al 2017]. Also, they could help to assess when during an emerging outbreak vaccines should best be
503 used, and what are the trade-offs between fast production, effectiveness, and broadness/specificity of
504 vaccines or drugs [Hollingsworth et al 2012].

505

506 **5 Challenges in modelling non-pharmaceutical interventions, human behaviour**

507 NPIs are measures used to control transmission of infection in the absence of vaccination or treatment.
508 For a respiratory virus like SARS-CoV-2, these have included stay-at-home orders, closure of non-
509 essential workplaces, schools, hospitality and leisure facilities, limits on sizes of gatherings, border
510 controls and travel restrictions, curfews and personal protective equipment (PPE) requirements (e.g.,
511 use of face masks). For a sexually transmitted infection, these may be condom use, having fewer sexual
512 partners, or voluntary male circumcision. Some NPIs which reduce social mixing can be relatively
513 untargeted, such as stay-at-home orders applied to the majority of the population. More targeted
514 measures aim to reduce contacts among those most likely to be infectious, such as Test, Trace and
515 Isolate policies (TTI). Others, like the use of PPE or condom use, work by reducing the risk of
516 transmission per contact. Border controls and travel restrictions aim to limit the seeding of new
517 infections internationally or across regions. Establishing baselines for comparison and defining the levels
518 at which human behaviour should be included in models have previously been discussed [Eames et al,
519 2015; Funk et al, 2015]. However, recent advances in data availability have highlighted the complex
520 interplay of variability in human behaviour across socioeconomic and demographic scales.

521

522 **5.1 Heterogeneity of populations and contact networks**

523 Behavioural responses and engagement with NPIs and TTI will likely not be uniform across populations,
524 over time and across different combinations of interventions. Models of NPIs, TTI and other

525 interventions should therefore capture uptake and adherence in order to assess possible effectiveness
526 in practice. Analyses should consider interactions with other interventions (e.g. relationship between
527 isolation take-up and work-at-home orders) and with operational parameters (e.g. testing uptake and
528 booking delays), the potential for threshold effects, uptake along multiple steps in an intervention,
529 potential trade-offs and compensatory behaviours, scales of adherence (e.g. a partial but incomplete
530 reduction in non-essential contacts) and sustainability of adherence over time.

531

532 **There are important heterogeneities in capabilities across population groups to engage with**
533 **interventions, which likely correlate with other risks of infection.** These heterogeneities present
534 challenges both in the interpretation of the relevant data, and in selecting the salient features for each
535 model. Many settings have observed stark socioeconomic and ethnic inequalities across the population
536 with respect to COVID-19 infection and mortality, some of which reflect long standing societal effects on
537 vulnerability to severe disease and some of which reflect inequalities in exposure including the ability to
538 physically distance (adhere to NPIs) and take up and adhere to isolation or quarantine notifications (SPI-
539 B, 2020). For instance, the ability to work from home is related to measures of socioeconomic
540 deprivation and associated with probability of infection with SARS-CoV-2 [Pouwels et al., 2021, EMG
541 Transmission Group, 2021]. The individuals, and the characteristics of their social contact networks, who
542 are still working outside of the home and making out-of-household contacts during 'lockdown', are
543 different from those who are able to reduce their contacts. They are likely to have larger household
544 sizes or to work in high-contact roles or within non-policy adherent workplaces, with implications for
545 how the contact network scales with implementation of NPIs and for what can be assumed about
546 adherence to other interventions such as TTI [Public Health England, 2020].

547

548 **To understand the effectiveness of interventions, we need ways to model clustering of intervention**
549 **uptake and adherence among individuals who might also cluster on the network of contacts, the**
550 **potential transmission network.** We can attempt to model these clusters either by including particular
551 settings within the model, such as schools or workplaces with their own contact patterns, or via
552 including particular classes of individuals. The modelling required to capture the transmission patterns
553 will vary significantly depending on the degree of integration between the cluster and the wider
554 community, e.g., an outbreak on a mostly closed campus (such as a university or factory with employee
555 dormitories) will have a different impact than an outbreak in a high-risk work setting where employees
556 return to their own homes daily.

557 Despite the key modelling role in correctly embedding clusters into the community, beyond age
558 classification, descriptions of social contacts by other population heterogeneities are often limited by

559 the availability of data, or pertain to a specific outbreak investigation that does not easily generalise
560 [Section 2, behaviour]. These often do not account for compensatory/altered contact patterns as a
561 result of an NPI seeking to limit infectious contacts, such as those deriving from informal childcare
562 provision when schools are closed.

563

564 **Shared structural influences on uptake and adherence to interventions by neighbourhood or local
565 area could lead to ‘pockets’ of high transmission and disease** [Vitora et al., 2018, Todd et al., 2021].

566 Including indices of social deprivation in a structured population model, or levels of deprivation in a
567 spatial model, can reflect socioeconomic influences on behavioural engagement with interventions
568 [Section 2, adherence]. Household models might instead assume a higher probability of introduction of
569 infection into the household, while accounting for the variable household sizes as they correlate with
570 income. Agent-based models could explore the impacts of TTI or other such interventions according to
571 the number of infectious contacts of each person, their personal adherence to interventions, and any
572 changes to adherence based on the adherence of those around them. All of these models would
573 further benefit from knowing what proportion of contacts from a person within a cluster are also a part
574 of the same cluster [Centola et al., 2010, Sprague et al., 2017]. Generalised modelling approaches to
575 population heterogeneities have previously considered contact networks where the degree distribution
576 of contacts captures this variability, though time-varying components in modified homogeneously
577 mixing compartmental models can achieve similar effects [Bansal et al., 2007].

578

579 Clustering in behaviours may result from a shared local environment, such as in areas where there are
580 many individuals in insecure jobs without sick pay or arise via direct behavioural influences over a
581 network of social relationships. The resultant patterns of clustering that this might produce and the
582 effects on transmission of infections will depend upon the extent to which these social relationships and
583 the potential transmission network ties overlay each other. Increasingly, the ‘virtual’ network ties via
584 social media are becoming important for influencing uptake and adherence to interventions and
585 vaccination, though the extent to which these overlap with potential transmission networks, and
586 therefore the effects on epidemic dynamics might differ [Wilson et al., 2020]. Some interventions utilise
587 social networks for their recruitment [Nikolopoulos et al., 2016] or distribution [Lippman et al., 2019],
588 adding another consideration to dependencies between different network types in influencing the
589 effectiveness of interventions against future pandemics.

590

591 **Uptake and adherence to interventions, and their impact on the characteristics of the contact
592 network, could also change as a function of the epidemic itself.** It is feasible to model population

593 behavioural responses, and uptake and adherence to interventions, as dynamic and as dependent on
594 characteristics of the epidemic [Funk et al., 2015], but it remains challenging in practice to specify the
595 relationship, especially for a new infection and in the context of an emergency [Teslya 2020]. In
596 practice, the public does not have perfect information about the course of the epidemic and is in some
597 cases actively misinformed. This lack of information is enhanced by delays between infection,
598 symptoms, hospitalisations and death [Pellis et al., 2020, da Silva et al., 2019]. Furthermore, there may
599 be strong barriers to adherence which are independent of individuals' willingness or intentions. Under
600 imperfect adherence to multiple NPIs, quantifying which interventions are most impactful is essential
601 for managing an outbreak.

602

603 **5.2 Contact tracing, quarantine, and isolation**

604 One of the main advantages of contact tracing and cluster investigation is that they are directed
605 specifically to individuals who are more likely to have been exposed to the infection. However,
606 capturing the specific contact network and the TTI process over such a network constitutes a key
607 modelling challenge for mathematical epidemiology [Müller & Kretzschmar 2021], particularly because
608 realistic networks and clustering due to social settings (e.g., households and workplaces) are difficult to
609 measure and describe mathematically (see also Ch 06), but strongly affect the effectiveness of contact
610 tracing [House & Keeling 2010]. Different tracing policies (e.g., forward tracing of the secondary cases or
611 backward tracing of the potential infector of a confirmed case) require different modelling
612 considerations [Müller et al 2000; Kojaku et al 2021], although in practice it is often impossible to
613 identify the direction of the infection between two confirmed cases. Backward/forward tracing often
614 becomes indistinguishable from outbreak investigation, which focuses on transmission in particular
615 environments rather than between specific individuals, bringing in additional complexities in terms of
616 modelling possibly overlapping clustered networks and superspreading events. Contact tracing serves a
617 dual role as a transmission surveillance and control tool, finding cases among harder-to-reach groups,
618 and informing interventions which break transmission chains. The balance between these roles can vary
619 greatly.

620

621 Contact tracing typically requires an extensive infrastructure able to identify infected cases and swiftly
622 search and isolate as many of their contacts as possible. In the case of fast epidemics, this translates
623 into important limitations, for instance in terms of the maximal number of individuals that can be
624 reached and isolated every day and unavoidable delays along the process, which strongly influence the
625 effectiveness of the intervention [Kretzschmar et al 2020, Contreras et al 2021]. Modelling the real
626 impact of these limitations is often extremely challenging, but at the same time fundamental to

627 evaluate the effectiveness of TTI and identify what aspects can be improved. The effectiveness of TTI
628 needs to be balanced with the societal impact of quarantine, which depends on its duration and
629 effectiveness in preventing onward transmission [Ashcroft et al 2021]. Recently smartphone apps for
630 digital contact tracing have been developed, which are aimed at mitigating these limitations, while
631 introducing further challenges connected with a realistic modelling of the app uptake and mechanisms
632 [Ferretti et al 2020].

633
634 One of the main objectives of modelling interventions is to analyse their cost-effectiveness. Depending
635 on the particular contact tracing policy, not only infected individuals, but all (possibly healthy) known
636 contacts of a confirmed case may be required to quarantine. This introduces further complexities, as an
637 effective mathematical model should keep track not only of the infector-infectee pairs, but also of the
638 infectious contacts where transmission was unsuccessful, in order to quantify the potential disruption to
639 healthy individuals and society in general [Kucharski et al 2020] (see also Section 7).

640

641 **6 Challenges in parameter estimation and model fitting**

642 Fitting a model to data can have two main goals: one goal is to estimate parameters that have not been
643 measured by fitting to those that have been measured; the second goal is to fit a model to observations
644 up to the present in order to predict what will happen in the future. The nature of challenges to
645 modelling and inferring impacts of interventions will vary at different stages of an epidemic. For
646 prediction of intervention impact, much work is done using scenario simulation using mathematical
647 models of transmission [Davies et al 2020; Teslya 2020]. Expert elicitation may be an option, but that
648 also comes with its own challenges [Section 5 of Ch 07].

649

650 Interventions have the potential to impact numbers in all compartments of a compartmental model, as
651 well as a large proportion of/all individuals in IBMs, but many of those impacts are unobservable
652 directly and must be inferred indirectly from changes in positive test rates or numbers of deaths and/or
653 hospitalisations [Section 2, surveillance data]. Observation models are required in this case, using latent
654 states or other statistical approaches to account for delays on impacts. Exactly what aspect(s) of the
655 model the intervention is impacting and the exact form in which the intervention is introduced to the
656 model will change the level of interpretation that can be made, such as whether the impact is directly
657 on specific outputs of the model, or forcing introduced on specific model parameters. Interventions can
658 also be introduced at different strengths and levels, and measuring that level of severity and how it
659 changes through time is challenging from both a modelling and a statistical perspective. Non-linear
660 effects are potential issues, as are qualitative interventions.

661
662 Political and national boundaries are usually the domain on which interventions are introduced [Section
663 2 of Ch 02], but there are many other geographical, political and behavioural boundaries that will
664 impact the efficacy of intervention measures, that may or may not be known or observable. The fact
665 that there has been little attempt to introduce global interventions- combined with the fact that a
666 variety of measures is often introduced even within countries and nations- has made tracking
667 interventions and measuring their impact particularly challenging [Flaxman et al 2020; Brauner et al
668 2021]. The introduction of multiple interventions simultaneously, such as closing borders, schools,
669 pubs, shopping centres, etc. can make extracting the success of any single measure difficult [Soltecz et
670 al 2020]. Statistical identification of parameters measuring individual impacts will likely be impossible,
671 as structural and practical non-identifiability will be at play without careful experimental design and
672 model sensitivity analysis [Browning et al 2020]. Multiple layers of interventions such as NPIs make the
673 evaluation of these layers individually incredibly difficult as the epidemics evolve, especially as the
674 introduction of subsequent NPIs can impact the efficacy of or adherence to existing interventions. More
675 transmissible variants, escape variants and associated increased/decreased mortality may also
676 necessitate the re-evaluation of model estimates or flexibility within the model for those estimates to
677 be temporally indexed. There is a challenge in measuring if an intervention is inherently unsuccessful, or
678 whether it is unsuccessful due to a lack of public adherence [Gelfand et al 2021] [Section 2,
679 adherence/behavioural data; Section 5]. These uncertainties, coupled with underreporting of case
680 incidence and asymptomatic individuals, also make estimation and communication of intervention
681 impacts challenging. Experimental design of interventions in pandemic scenarios, which otherwise may
682 be the most appropriate approach in other domains, inevitably has significant challenges for ethical
683 reasons, as well as associated political and logistical difficulties.

684
685 Between-country comparisons often receive significant backlash from politicians and the media and can
686 easily be open to criticism for not accounting for some underlying process that has not been considered
687 (demographic or environmental differences, for example) [Pearce et al 2020; Xiang and Swallow 2021;
688 Komarova et al 2020]. Data collection procedures also vary drastically between nations and privacy
689 constraints make large-scale analyses challenging to complete.

690
691 There is a large range of different models used to study epidemic outcomes, all with their own
692 assumptions, mechanisms and uncertainties. Measuring impacts of interventions will subsequently vary
693 according to which model is used or which data are used to estimate it. Combining the impact of
694 interventions observed across models adds an additional dimension to the challenges. There is also a

695 significant difference between models used for explanation or estimation and those used for prediction
696 or forecasting, both structurally and from a philosophical perspective [Hanna 1969; Shmueli 2010]. This
697 will be particularly challenging when choosing between models for estimating impacts of interventions
698 as opposed to models developed for scenario exploration or forecasting. It is therefore important not to
699 assume automatically that these models can be used interchangeably.

700

701 **7 Challenges in modelling health economic and political aspects of interventions**

702 NPIs seek to reduce transmission through reducing the number, length, and/or intensity of contacts
703 between people where transmission could occur. Some of the NPIs mentioned above are relatively cost-
704 free – for example, mask wearing is considered a moderately effective NPI, requiring minimal upfront
705 cost from mask users, and having minimal impact on day-to-day activities for most users [Greenhalgh
706 2020, Czypionka et al. 2020]. Other NPIs can be highly costly in micro- and macroeconomic terms – for
707 example, the closure of non-essential shops and/or hospitality sectors. For respiratory pathogens, these
708 more restrictive NPIs are likely to be both more effective at reducing transmission and much more
709 costly to individuals and the broader economy than less restrictive NPIs. In addition, the imposition of
710 NPIs that affect the extent to which people are able to work productively will have a direct impact on
711 household finances, and are likely to cause a proportion of households to fall below the poverty line.

712 To allow decision makers to make these trade-offs in a consistent and data-driven way, there is a
713 **challenge for transmission modellers and health economists assessing the impact and cost-
714 effectiveness of NPIs to quantify and include broader household costs and macroeconomic impacts.**

715 The measurement of household costs is comparatively simple, and a range of validated and tested tools
716 exist to measure an exhaustive list of medical and non-medical expenditures [World Health
717 Organization, 2017], though it is critical that comparable data are collected before and after the
718 imposition of NPIs. The estimation of the broader macroeconomic impact of NPIs is more challenging,
719 and generally requires the combining of epidemiological transmission models and complex
720 macroeconomic models [Keogh-Brown et al. 2020, Smith et al. 2020]. Ideally models would be fully
721 combined, allowing feedback between epidemiological and macroeconomic factors – for example, if the
722 closure of a sector’s workplaces reduces social mixing but leads to a fall in productivity resulting in
723 redundancies, workers’ movements between sectors with different levels of mixing would also change
724 transmission. However, in practice, it is very complex to stratify epidemiological and macroeconomic
725 models in a sufficiently detailed and consistent way to reflect these feedback loops, and the current
726 state-of-the-art is for transmission model outputs to inform macroeconomic models.

727 Another important challenge is **how to represent financial and non-financial constraints in models**
728 [Bozzani et al. 2018, Bozzani et al. 2020]. The majority of health economic evaluations, including in
729 infectious diseases, take a marginal approach and assess the incremental costs and benefits of
730 interventions and policies. This approach ignores that the total costs of programmes may be very high,
731 such as when entire populations require vaccinating against newly emerged pathogens. It is therefore
732 important that economic evaluations of interventions that are delivered to a substantial fraction of the
733 population incorporate full budget impact analyses [Weerasuriya et al. 2021].

734 In practice, non-financial constraints are arguably more critical and much less visible than financial
735 constraints. For example, patients in intensive care may require ventilators, but also – critically – one-to-
736 one nursing care and attention from specialist intensive care clinicians. These human resource inputs
737 cannot be quickly scaled up in pandemic response. Therefore, models estimating the number of people
738 with care needs reliant on human resources and other non-financial factors for their delivery – for
739 example, critical care staff, oxygen, needles, and treatment drug doses – should consider these
740 operational needs. It is generally possible to include constraints and optimisation functions in models
741 without requiring significant structural changes and doing so could help to inform real-world
742 prioritisation of scarce resources.

743 Finally, people experience health and economic impacts of infectious diseases differently.
744 Socioeconomic status is a key stratum across which health and economic indicators vary and ensuring
745 equitable benefits from health interventions and programmes, but **incorporating equity aspects into**
746 **infectious disease models is a key challenge**. For example, recent methodological advances in equity-
747 informative cost-effectiveness analysis provides a readily applicable analytical framework. The key
748 contribution of these methods is the disaggregation of health impacts and economic consequences
749 across equity strata, for example distribution across people of different socioeconomic status.

750 Recent applications of extended cost-effectiveness analyses using infectious disease models add
751 decision making value compared to models which do not disaggregate outcomes by equity strata, yet
752 these are subject to a number of highly restrictive assumptions such as perfectly assortative mixing
753 within strata, uniform underlying distribution of susceptibility, transmission conditional on exposure,
754 and severity and death conditional on infection. In reality, data to parameterize these assumptions is
755 hard to obtain – for example the extent to which people of different strata contact – or do not contact –
756 each other. Where data are available, they are likely to be confounded by other factors; for example,
757 observing a greater rate of deaths due to an infectious pathogen could be due to differential and
758 potentially unquantifiable mixing, susceptibility, or severity in each group.

Topic	Key challenges
General <i>Section 1</i>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ◇ Find models that are complex enough to reflect the system we want to describe in sufficient detail, but simple enough so that we do not get lost in the jungle of details. ◇ Need to clearly define objectives and aims of modelling in interaction with policy makers
Data related to interventions <i>Section 2</i>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ◇ Designing in advance data collection studies and statistical methods to overcome biases in biological data. ◇ Developing methods to account and correct for lags and scarcity in surveillance data ◇ Wider accessibility to mobility and behavioural data to quantify how interventions change contact patterns.
Mathematical framework <i>Section 3</i>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ◇ Developing robust, flexible modelling tools that are readily available to plan interventions during epidemics ◇ Designing public health measures that match the temporal and spatial scale of interventions with those of transmission ◇ Translating modelling theory about pathogen evolution into epidemic-specific interventions that limit the risk of variants of concern emerging
Pharmaceutical interventions <i>Section 4</i>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ◇ Modelling population heterogeneity (e.g., in vaccine efficacy, uptake, transmission) to investigate optimal vaccine prioritisation and allocation ◇ Modelling vaccine strategies in a highly dynamic environment (including time-varying vaccine rollout, introduction of different vaccines with single or multiple doses, changes in NPIs) ◇ Incorporating mechanisms to describe how treatment affects epidemic dynamics ◇ Defining and modelling elimination
NPI <i>Section 5</i>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ◇ Capturing adherence and take-up of NPIs across heterogeneous populations and contact networks ◇ Modelling clustering in behaviour and its relation to clustering in e.g. geography or socioeconomic status ◇ Incorporating the factors responsible for changing behaviour (take-up and adherence) over time.
Parameter estimation, Model fitting <i>Section 6</i>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ◇ Parameterising multiple layers of interventions and their time-varying impacts ◇ Statistical identification of different overlapping intervention impacts ◇ Intervention impact detection across models
Economic modelling <i>Section 7</i>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ◇ Including macroeconomic costs is critical to understand the full impact of infectious diseases and their control measures ◇ Financial and non-financial constraints matter and need to be reflected in models ◇ Different groups experience diseases and interventions differently, and models need to represent inequities better

760 **Table 1:** Key challenges

761

762 In practice, models have been informative with relatively simple distributional assumptions across these
763 factors, and where data are unknown or highly confounded, sensitivity analyses can show whether
764 plausible differences by socioeconomic strata between, for example, mixing and severity, explain the
765 differential outcomes observed [Munday et al, 2018].

766 **8 Discussion and conclusions**

767 Use of mathematical modelling to assess the impact of interventions has taken enormous strides since
768 the turn of the century, fuelled by an increasing number of emergence events of new pathogens, large
769 outbreaks of infectious diseases spanning several countries or continents, and the fast increase in
770 computing power and communication speed. Nevertheless, many challenges remain for the modelling
771 community in developing fast, precise, and flexible tools for supporting public health responses to
772 future pandemics.

773
774 We discussed different types of interventions, each posing various challenges in terms of data
775 availability and modelling requirements (Table 1). We did not address the possibilities of synergy or
776 interference of different interventions, when rolled out simultaneously. If there are interactions, one
777 also needs to ask in which order interventions should best be rolled out, or which combinations of
778 interventions are most effective. These are extremely complex questions for mathematical modelling.

779
780 While this document focuses on the impact of human-to-human transmission, zoonotic spill over and
781 vector-borne diseases (e.g., dengue fever and malaria) remain key areas of concern for future
782 pandemics. Where animals can act as an infection reservoir and continue to seed infection among
783 humans, targeted interventions are required, with a corresponding new set of behavioural interventions
784 and structural pressures on uptake and adherence. The challenges of those transmission routes have
785 been discussed a.o. by Hollingsworth et al (2015), Brooks-Pollock et al (2015), Lloyd-Smith et al (2015),
786 and are explored further in [Roberts et al (Ch 02); Metcalf et al (Ch 03)].

787
788 The challenges for modelling interventions identified and discussed here are diverse. Finding solutions
789 will require a broad variety of skills and expertise, ranging from mathematical creativity and precision
790 over biological insight to social sciences and communication skills. It is clear that addressing these
791 challenges will require the strong collaboration of researchers from different disciplines, and close
792 communication between scientists and policy makers. Only if knowledge and ideas from different fields
793 can be combined, will it be possible to find solutions to the broad questions sketched in this document.
794 We have witnessed a continuous development of the research field loosely termed “infectious disease
795 dynamics” in the last decades, in which various strands of research including applied mathematics,
796 pathogen biology, human behaviour, economics, and policy science have grown together and merged to
797 create a fascinating and rapidly expanding research field.

798

799 While scientists have established closer and closer international collaborations over the last decades,
800 and research in mathematical modelling of infectious diseases has developed into a truly international
801 activity, there is much less international collaboration in the actual response to a pandemic [Priesemann
802 et al 2021]. Policy making and pandemic response is limited by country borders, and which leads to
803 asynchronous waves of an epidemic between countries and out of phase epidemics just across a border.
804 Hopefully, good collaboration among scientists can eventually also inspire more cross-country
805 collaboration in fighting a pandemic.

806

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814

815 **Authors contributions**

816 All authors took part in discussions and wrote sections of the manuscript. MEK coordinated discussions
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818 approved the final version for publication.

819

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